Among the many pleasures that fiction puts on offer, the opportunity to lose oneself in mild abstraction is by no means the least, and I imagine that all of us have availed ourselves of that opportunity, whether sparingly or in a more insouciant manner. For my part, I am intrigued by the different shapes that state of abstraction assumes, and by its conditions of possibility. I would propose to parse it closely and methodically here, were it not for the fact that its dimensions are so mutable, as mutable as individual readerly experience can be. Instead, I shall focus on a few textual passages that seem to me to incorporate clear invitations to the kind of abstracted state that interests me, hoping thereby better to understand that phenomenon.
Many things could be said about this textual moment. I am chiefly interested, however, in the way that the narrator imagines his own situation with regard to the world around him. On the one hand, he is clearly inside his apartment, looking out at the street and at the people hurrying along it. On the other hand, as soon as he imagines that those people are in an aquarium, his position shifts to that of someone on the outside looking in. That outside-inness is more than passingly uncanny, and yet it seems to me perfectly exemplary of the kind of site that we inhabit when we read fiction. Inside Out For clearly, reading is a real-world activity. By that I mean that it takes place in the world of phenomena, a behavior that is conditioned (and sometimes constrained) by real-world considerations. We sit upright in our favorite chair or sprawl flat out on our sofa; the dogs are barking or they are silent; the telephone rings or it does not; our gimpy right knee is bothering us or it feels okay; we have made our mortgage payment on time or we are badly in arrears. Yet when we read fiction, we also dwell in the fictional world. Therein, we partake of the heady fruit of the lotus and lose ourselves. We listen as a peer of the realm sounds his horn too late; we gaze aghast upon the tortured souls in the eighth circle of Hell; we test the keen edge of a harpoon honed by a tattooed Kokovokoan; we detect the very particular aromas emanating from the kitchen as a middle-aged Irishman prepares to dine on the inner organs of beasts and fowls; we taste a perfectly prepared martini cocktail, shaken, not stirred.
In other terms, we are always divided when we read fiction. We are here, but we are also there-and vice versa, as it were. We may not be the only ones whose attention is divided, moreover. Ross Chambers has argued that certain kinds of literature are characterized by a similar kind of divided attention. Pointing toward works that wager upon the dilatory, upon apparent idleness and diversion, Chambers coins the term loiterature to designate them. "Critical as it may well be behind its entertaining façade," he argues, "loiterly writing disarms criticism of itself by presenting a moving target, shifting as its own divided attention constantly shifts" (Loiterature 9). That kind of literature wagers squarely, I believe, upon our own willingness to be divided. Jean-Philippe Toussaint, in the passage that I quoted, invites us to read in that divided manner through the mediation of his protagonist, whose attention is so patently divided. Now, it is reasonable to imagine that the extent of that division (or the proportion of our attention devoted to the real or the fictional world at any given moment) will depend upon a variety of factors: the excellence of the text; the suggestibility and general humor of the individual reader; the local circumstances in which the act of reading takes place; and other considerations still more imponderable. Yet it is legitimate to say that any reading will entail a division of the subject's attention, to a greater or a lesser degree.
Seen in long focus, what is surprising about our behavior as readers is how easily we migrate from the phenomenal world to the fictional world, and back again. Indeed, that migration is so fluid and so constant that it may be more useful to imagine the reader as inhabiting both worlds simultaneously. In his study of the mise-en-abyme, Lucien Dällenbach suggests that that figure can assume three broad shapes. First, the simple emblazonment of like within like: a play within a play, a novel within a novel. Second, a structure of infinite emblazonment: the Quaker on a box of Quaker Oats holding in his hand a box of Quaker Oats upon which a smaller Quaker holds a box of Quaker Oats, and so forth. Finally, an aporetic emblazonment in which the relations between container and contained are shifting and unclear (Le Récit spéculaire 37-38, 51). That latter structure is a good way to conceive of our situation as readers of fiction, I think, because it accounts for the difficulty we experience as we try to parse the relations between our divided readerly selves, and it allows us to imagine the real world and the fictional world in an isotopical and mutually implicative fashion, rather than in a hierarchical manner where one is always subordinated to the other. That perspective provides us in turn with a more lucid vision of our behavior as readers, a set of gestures that is sharpened, intensified, and refined by the immersive power of fiction.
Literary texts issue the kind of invitation I have been talking about liberally and frequently. Sometimes it is encoded in a very brief passage, like this one, borrowed from Don DeLillo's The Body Artist: "he'd placed her in a set of counter-surroundings, of simultaneous insides and outsides" (48). At other times, texts prepare such invitations lovingly and couch them in narrative contexts that are far more amply furnished. In The Mysterious Commission, a novel by Michael Innes, a character gazes from a passing train at a house in which he had recently been held captive, and in which the only distraction available to him had been to gaze out of the window at passing trains:
It was like a dream-a through-the-looking-glass dream. Everything was there, but everything was the wrong way round. There was the train, but he was looking from the train. There was the house, but he was looking at the house. There was the gap in the trees, but it was quite close up on him instead of quite far away. And the house was just a house, precisely as the train had been just a train until he got those binoculars on it. A large house, but totally anonymous. It rang no bell with him. But then there was no reason why it should. He had never been able to stand back from it and view it coup d 'oeil before. (132) The uncanniness that the character experiences hinges on everything seeming to be "the wrong way round." It is thus precisely analogous to the feeling that Jean-Philippe Toussaint's narrator has when he muses that, rather than looking out of his window at people on the street, he might be gazing into an aquarium. It is also strictly akin to the sense of "simultaneous insides and outsides" that DeLillo's heroine feels. There is yet another term in the passage from Michael Innes that bears notice. The notion of being "able to stand back from" a given object or event "and view it coup d'oeil" is an important one. Because in passages such as these, the "object" that we are invited to "view" is the text itself, and the "event" is our own encounter with that text. In other words, one of Inside Out the invitations that such passages extend to us is to watch ourselves read: to examine that very process with enough distance to be critical about it, and to draw the conclusions that seem to us to be legitimate.
Reflections
I would like to make one final point about the passage from The Mysterious Commission before leaving it. The allusion to Lewis Carroll is not mere window dressing. To the contrary, it points toward a textual moment that constitutes a distinguished antecedent to the scene that Innes describes, and furthermore puts on display a useful set of terms for thinking through the latter. For one remembers how Through the Looking-Glass ends. In the final chapter, entitled "Which Dreamed It?" Alice muses that all of her recent adventures may have been a dream. Yet she cannot say for certain whose dream it was, her own or that of the Red King: "He was part of my dream, of course-but then I was part of his dream, too!" (344). In other terms, Alice cannot decide if she is outside or inside, the dreamer or the dreamed, a figure conjured up by someone else or a conjurer herself. The kitten that she enlists to adjudicate the question merely licks its paws, in a very "provoking" manner, refusing to pronounce on the matter. As a last gesture, Carroll reformulates that question and addresses it directly and inevitably to us: "Which do you think it was?" (344).
I qualify that address as "direct" even though we know there is some mediation here. For we should recognize that this is a case of a narrator speaking to a narratee. Yet we must also recognize that Carroll is wagering upon a more powerful effect here, one that relies upon our willingness to imagine that the question is addressed to us. Our semiotic desire coaxes us in that direction, certainly, and our readerly narcissism does, too. I call it "inevitable" because it cannot be avoided: pungent and lapidary, the question fixes us in its crosshairs. It is interesting to note that as soon as we imagine that the question is addressed to us, we become as it were characters in the fictional world-or at least our readerly selves perform that emigration. Moreover, the ending of Through the LookingGlass produces its richest meaning only if we conceive things in such a fashion. For that question, addressed to us, makes explicit a set of queries that echo implicitly throughout the text. Where do we stand with regard to the fictional world? Are we outside looking in or inside looking out? Do we create the world or are we created by it? The answers that Carroll limns suggest that those positions are mutually implicative, that they cannot be disintricated without losing their heuristic power, and that they are most usefully conceived in their simultaneity. In short, what the ending of Through the Looking-Glass puts in evidence is a vision of fiction as a shared dream.
I do not wish to argue that the idea as Lewis Carroll puts it forward is an utterly original one. To the contrary, it is a venerable cultural topos. One of its classic formulations occurs in Zhuangzi's writings, which date from the third century BCE. It may be found at very end of the chapter entitled "Discussion on Making All Things Equal." It is commonly referred to as "The Butterfly Dream," and it goes like this:
Once Zhuang Zhou dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn't know he was Zhuang Zhou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable Zhuang Zhou. But he didn't know if he was Zhuang Zhou who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming that he was Zhuang Zhou. Between Zhuang Zhou and a butterfly there must be some distinction! This is called the Transformation of Things. (44) Daoists would undoubtedly argue that the transformation of things is a process involving the making of all things equal, and that our recognition of the fundamental equality of things is a first and necessary step toward enlightenment. Readers of a less contemplative stripe may see in "The Butterfly Dream" a parable of the relations between the phenomenal world and the world of imagination, a parable whose lesson points toward the way that those notions depend each upon the other for their meaningso much so in fact that it is futile to invoke either one without the other.
That kind of dynamic reciprocity lies at the heart of the topos, both in Zhuangzi's formulation and in Lewis Carroll's. It is a key feature of the fables of literature and its uses that Jean-Philippe Toussaint and Michael Innes tell, too. It reminds us that the real and the imaginary are both mobile constructs rather than static ones, that they can be conceived only in their reciprocal mobility, and that we, too, are constantly in motion. We cannot survey either world, thus, from a fixed and stable vantage point; rather, we must apprehend things in their proper flow while we ourselves are in a state of flux.
Such a process can be extremely arduous, and sometimes our mind rebels. Sometimes our need for stability is so imperious that we persuade ourselves of our stillness, against the evidence of our senses. Chris Scott constructs a scene like that in To Catch a Spy: "The train's hydraulics hissed and the station moved backwards as if jolted by an unseen hand" (310). The sensation that his character experiences is familiar to most of us (though these days it is more likely to occur when a plane we're in pulls back from the jetway). The very brief moment that it takes for us to recalibrate and realize that it is in fact we who are moving never fails to produce an uncanny feeling, one that hinges largely on a jarring shift from subject to object. We prefer to occupy the former site if we can, until undeniable circumstance evicts us, for it is a place of privilege with Inside Out regard to everything that surrounds it. It enables us to survey things as if we were not part of them, nor subject to the laws that govern them. It allows us to think that we are central. It indulges our wish to believe that things are about us.
Upon rare occasion, one may experience a sensation that plays out in a fashion contrary to the one I have just described, that is, where one has the impression of moving, though one is in fact remaining still. Consider for example this scene from Hélène Lenoir's Le Répit, where a man seated in a train at rest in a station gazes out the window at another train: "The train slowly pulling out on the other side of the platform made him think for a few seconds that he himself was leaving" (122; my translation, as elsewhere, unless otherwise noted). The impression that this event produces in the man is no less uncanny than the one that Chris Scott's character experiences, even though the circumstances appear so different. In both instances, it is a question of misinterpretation, of course; yet that misinterpretation is itself brimming with meaning, a meaning that focuses most fundamentally upon how we conceive the world and our place in it.
For my own part (and granted my present purposes), I wonder if we may have been struck by the sensation that Scott and Lenoir invoke in yet another context. I wonder if we may have had a very similar feeling from time to time when reading fiction. When some event in the phenomenal world jolts us out of our immersion in the fictional world, for instance, and we shake our heads for a moment while we recalibrate, not quite knowing which world trumps the other. Much like Alice, waking from her dream. I am encouraged in this line of thinking by another passage in Toussaint's La Salle de bain. Once again, it takes place in a train (the fourth train we have taken thus far, by my count, and it won't be the last), traveling between Paris and Venice:
I had spent the night in a train compartment, alone, with the lights out, immobile. Aware of motion, only motion; of the outward perceptible motion that was transporting me despite my immobility, but also of the inner motion of my body that was destroying itself, an imperceptible motion that began to occupy my attention to the exclusion of all else, a motion I desperately wanted to seize hold of. But how to grasp it? (39) How indeed? The narrator's situation is a peculiar one, for he feels himself to be immobile contrary to all evidence. Immobile both with regard to the world outside, as the train speeds across the landscape, and with regard to the world inside, as his own bodily processes push him toward death. Belonging thus neither to the outside nor to the inside, where in the world can he be? Once more, it seems to me that the site toward which Toussaint is pointing is a locus that fiction constructs, and his text invites us again and again, in a variety of manners, to inhabit that site. It is not simply a matter of suspension of disbelief, nor of a deliberate forgetting. Toussaint's invitation involves instead a choice taken deliberately and lucidly, as we reflect upon literature and its uses.
For it is very much a matter of reflection, I believe. Consider for example this passage, borrowed once again from Chris Scott:
The train clattered across a series of switches, and Stevens allowed himself to be lulled by its gentle swaying motion. [. . .] He gazed out on the endless muddy plain and saw his own image again, the reflection of a man on the inside looking out, a reversible image, as if the other were looking in. It was blurred like a double exposure, two images in one frame, the strobelike pattern of the rail ties falling aslant the window. Something there is about a train, he thought, something that annihilates time. The most interesting aspect of this passage is the way that Scott deploys two key gestures of the critical novel, on the one hand the idea of insideoutness, and on the other hand the mirror scene. He vexes the one against the other here, like a Boy Scout rubbing two sticks together, in order to produce a kind of textual combustion. What results is not lacking in surprise, because gazing out of the window, the subject focuses not on the world, but instead on himself. The image is doubled-but of course we are always doubled in mirrors, and indeed that is one of the things that is most fascinating (and troubling) about them. The particularity of this scene resides in the difficulty that the subject has in reading the image: is he inside looking out, or outside looking in? More troubling still is the question of identity: is it himself that he's gazing at, or is he suddenly an other? Is it a case of simple duplication here, or rather one of multiplication?
Another consideration that this passage puts forward is a brief (but nonetheless extremely pungent) meditation on reflection. It suggests in the first instance that simple reflection is never, well, "simple." Reflection always involves the image of a thing, and we are well aware that the image of a thing can never be the thing itself-even though we may catch ourselves from time to time wishing that it could be. Small wonder, then, that the subject's reflection in the glass should be a bit different from the face he believes himself to have; what gets lost in any reflection is the quiddity of the thing. Yet, just as there is a doubling effect in the mirror scene, so too is there a doubling of reflection. For the glass casts an image back to the beholder, to be sure, but the beholder also sees through that image. And just as the character is seized in the act of reflecting and being reflected, we readers may be in the same situation, if we choose to accept the invitation that this passage extends to us. Because on the one hand, the way the character reads his reflection mirrors our reading, and on the other hand, the way that he reflects upon reflection itself mirrors the way we come to terms with the highly specular dimension of this passage. Inside Out It is reasonable to believe, moreover, that any literary moment which wagers on the topos of reflection will have the potential to direct our attention toward issues of textual specularity. A passage from Tanguy Viel's La Disparition de Jim Sullivan will serve as a case in point:
In Detroit, according to what I read on the Internet, a person can perceive in his field of vision up to three thousand two hundred windows at the same time. I have never understood what that means, three thousand two hundred windows at the same time, but, I tell myself, if I write something like that in my novel, people will understand that my characters live in a big, complex, international city, a city filled with promises and glass surfaces. (11) (12) The moment is an important, emblematic one, because Viel's narrator is a French writer who is trying to write an "American" novel. The passage is heavily loaded, overdetermined with regard to its context, and eloquent with regard to the narrative technique that this individual practices. For what he puts forward as evidence of his research into American life is a mere factoid whose triviality beggars the imagination. The narrator claims not to understand it, but what is there to understand? What might lie behind those three thousand two hundred limpid surfaces-and what, if anything, might they reflect?
One suspects that in this instance Tanguy Viel is playing with his reader (as indeed he does throughout La Disparition de Jim Sullivan), offering up his narrator in sacrificial mode as someone who is significantly less agile and resourceful than the reader when it comes to interpretation, inviting the reader to take this passage as commentary not only on the narrator's writerly project, but also-in a very different spirit, howeveron Viel's own project. In other terms, he invites us to reflect upon literary strategy here, and to recognize the opportunity that the narrator wastes, as well as the one that Viel exploits. In so doing, we are both inside and outside. Inside to the degree that we focus upon the fictional, "en abyme" novel; outside to the degree that we focus upon the "real" novel. Inside to the extent that we plunge into the fiction; outside to the extent that we step back from it. Inside while beguiled by story; outside while we reflect upon discourse. And so forth.
The Fourth Wall
Invitations of a similar ilk-but more explicit still, if that were possible-abound in Christine Montalbetti's novels. A couple of examples will suffice. In the first chapter of L'Origine de l'homme, Montalbetti describes a meeting between her protagonist, Jacques Boucher de Crèvecoeur de Perthes, and her reader. Emerging from a swim in the river that flows by his house, Boucher de Perthes takes the time to dry and dress himself before he greets the latter figure: "Our hero [. . .] advances toward the reader, 'Pardon me for being late, I just took my daily bath in the Somme'" (14). Chattering about this and that in a pleasantly dilatory way, he offers his hand to the reader:
You take the hand that he extends and which must smell like the river, the water grasses, and maybe the soap which had been used to wash the bath towel, it clasps your hand in a frank handshake as they say, pulling it in a quick movement a bit downward, a movement you resist with your wrist, nothing limp or mean-spirited there, nor dead, nor even clammy, and manifests in its grip a real desire to welcome you. (16) The passage is a properly astonishing one, finely calculated to catch us off guard. We are not used to seeing ourselves in the fictions we read. Clearly, we can take a step back from this scene and tell ourselves that this figure is not us. Instead, it is a representation of the implied reader, or the virtual reader, or of some other mediatory construct that has very little to do with us, as we imagine ourselves to be. Nevertheless, there is something in this passage that appeals to us on a very fundamental level. To my own way of thinking, that appeal is bound up in the idea of hospitality, in the suggestion that we are welcome in this fictional world. Philippe Lejeune once remarked that Georges Perec's writing has a "convivial" quality; "there is a place for me in each of his texts," he argues, "a place for me to do something" (La Mémoire et l'oblique 41). A similar conviviality animates Christine Montalbetti's work. It functions as a key clause in the contract that she proposes to her reader, and it typically hinges on an invitation to enter into the text, to participate in the fable as it is being told, to immerse oneself in the fictional world.
Many examples of that strategy can be found in Montalbetti's writing, but I would like to adduce just one more. It can be found in Western, during a scene set in a general store. Cataloging the items found on the shelves of that store, the narrator remarks that the reader might like to buy one of them, as a souvenir. He or she could take it home, where it would serve as a conversation piece, inevitably eliciting the curiosity and the envy of the reader's guests:
And that, where did that come from, where did you find it, where did you buy it, you would answer them, Oh, that came from Western, and, carefully putting the object back where they found it, they would reply, Oh (probably they would never have heard of it), and you could explain to them, sit them down facing you in an overstuffed armchair (they're your friends, an old pillow suits them fine), and undertake to tell them the adventures of our thirty-something man. One might say many things about this passage, but what I find most distinctive about it is the way that Montalbetti couches it in a rhetoric of hospitality. She has invited her reader into the general store, and she does the honors there, pointing out this, then that, for the reader's benefit. She Inside Out foresees moreover that the reader will be equally hospitable to his or her own guests, when they inquire about the object the reader has acquired in Western.
Those gestures of hospitality cannot be disintricated, it seems to me, from the process of storytelling in which they are framed. Good stories are welcoming stories, Montalbetti suggests. Hospitality engenders hospitality, moreover, as the narrator's kindly gesture toward the reader begets the reader's gesture toward his or her guests. In just the same manner, narrative engenders narrative, because if we choose to follow the script that this passage provides, we will retell the story of Western to our guests. In our own fashion, perhaps, and highlighting certain things rather than others-in a word, appropriating the story and making it our own, before we pass it along to someone else. That is the heart of the matter, I think. And in point of fact, committed readers do take possession of stories and make them their own. We conceive that process in different ways, imagining it in more literal terms or more figurally. Sometimes we identify that process easily in others, but are blind to it where our own readerly practice is concerned. In certain moods, we welcome that recognition, in others we resist it for all we're worth.
I argued a moment ago that our attention is divided when we read fiction. I would like now to propose that such division is at its weakest ebb precisely at the moment of appropriation. Montalbetti remarks that "only fictional characters are entire in their actions" (Western 60). She is undoubtedly correct, insofar as fictional characters remain within the boundaries of their fictional worlds. For one imagines that if Emma Bovary or Stephen Dedalus were to set foot in the phenomenal world, they might find themselves just as divided as you or me. By the same token, our appropriation of a given story implies an act of emigration on our part: we step into the fictional world, assume the mantle of a fictional character, and act for a moment in a manner far less divided than is our wont, focusing our attention in laser-like fashion on the object of our desire.
Once again, we can be more literalist about this matter, or more coolly figuralist. Either way, what is at stake here is a gesture that is essentially metaleptic in nature. I wonder if any trope has been as consistently denigrated as metalepsis, while nonetheless continuing to survive in the lexicon of rhetoricians. Quintilian, for example, dismisses it out of hand in the Institutio Oratoria, seeing very little use in it (VIII.6.37-39). It fares not much better in our own time, where it is generally regarded as a scandalous, transgressive figure. Scandalous, because it affiliates things that ought to be kept-that must be kept!-separate. Transgressive, because it accomplishes a crossing between two realms, two thoughts, two terms, in a fashion contrary to the purported rules of the game. Gérard Genette, the leading student of tropes of his generation, wagers firmly on those notions when he speaks about metalepsis in Figures III: "The passage from one narrative level to another can only be accomplished, in principle, by narration, an act that consists precisely in introducing into a situation, by way of a discourse, the knowledge of another situation. Any other form of transit is, if not impossible, at least always transgressive" (243-44). The idea of transgression, along with the figures that attend it (unacceptability, marginality, illegitimacy, uncanniness, and so on), is absolutely central in Genette's conception of metalepsis. And the real scandal consists in the way it puts our readerly metaphysics in question: "The most troubling thing about metalepsis is the unacceptable and insistent hypothesis that the extradiegetic is perhaps always diegetic, and that the narrator and narratees, that is, you and I, belong perhaps to some story" (245). For there is where the real danger lies: we thought we were outside, but perhaps we're inside after all.
Demonstrably, the figure of metalepsis continues to "trouble" Genette throughout his career. In the early years of the twenty-first century, he delivered the keynote address at a colloquium devoted to that trope, and he authored a book entitled Métalepse. He continues to try to restrain the way that the figure ramifies, and to attenuate the way that it tends to implicate the reader in the fictional world. But he is swimming against the current, because he is forced to realize that contemporary culture teems with metaleptic effects in both directions, that is, from inside out and from outside in:
In truth, fiction is thoroughly nourished and animated by elements that come from material or spiritual reality: Harpagon's avarice, or Rastignac's ambition are constructed in contact with real life-and with other dramatic or novelistic works. This perpetual and reciprocal transfusion of real diegesis and fictional diegesis, and from one fiction to another, is the very soul of fiction in general, and of any fiction in particular. Any fiction is a tissue of metalepses. And any reality, too, when it recognizes itself in a fiction, and when it recognizes a fiction in its own universe: "That man is a real Don Juan." (Métalepse 131) His most recent writings suggest that Genette has reconciled himself with the figure to some degree. In Épilogue, for example, he remarks a "savory metaleptic intrusion" in Marcel Aymé's Uranus (151). The trope is (and continues to be) intrusive, in his view-but it is nonetheless admittedly delicious.
Pierre Bayard approaches the figure of metalepsis from a different angle, that of a reader whose worldview is not threatened by the idea of a constant backing-and-forthing between the phenomenal world and the fictional one. For Bayard, the key moment of a successful critical reading involves an event that is necessarily metaleptic in character: Inside Out
The precise location cannot be identified in the text, and the critic must rely on his impressions: the sense that the words he is reading have become strange or, to the contrary, too familiar; the idea that it's no longer about the other that he's speaking, but about himself; the presence of an aura of irreality, as if he were no longer on his side of the mirror, and had broken through the barrier of the page. (Demain est écrit 140) He argues indefatigably for the independence of fictional characters: "These people are not mere paper dolls, as we commonly think; rather, they are living beings whose existence is autonomous, and who sometimes go as far as committing murder unbeknownst to the author" (L'Affaire du chien des Baskerville 18-19). He imagines wormholes connecting the real world and the fictional world, and he argues that neither one is complete without the other. When we read, moreover, we shuttle constantly between one and the other.
In short, borrowing a term from Thomas Pavel, Bayard qualifies himself as an integrationist. In Fictional Worlds, Pavel succinctly describes two ways of thinking about the relations of the real and the fictional: "Some theoreticians promote a segregationist view of these relations, characterizing the content of fictional texts as pure imagination without truth value; their opponents adopt a tolerant, integrationist outlook, claiming that no genuine ontological difference can be found between fictional and nonfictional descriptions of the actual world" (11). Pavel himself maintains a moderate, relativist, and rationalist stance with regard to those relations, verging toward the segregationist position. Bayard, however, embraces intergrationism:
One will have guessed that the author of these lines takes his stand without the least hesitation in the integrationist camp, and, within that camp, among those folk most tolerant and accepting of that original form of existence incarnated by literary characters.
My tolerance toward creatures of fiction is based on two principal reasons. The first is the certainty of an immense permeability between fiction and reality. It is useless to attempt to police the borders between those worlds, because multiple paths traverse them, in both directions. Not only, as we shall see, do we dwell in a given fictional world for a more or less lengthy stay, but the inhabitants of that world cross over into our world from time to time, and live there.
The second reason-which would not be shared, I'm afraid, even by the most committed integrationists-is my deep conviction that literary characters enjoy a certain autonomy, both in their own world and in their migrations from that world to ours. Or, if you prefer to think of it that way, that we do not entirely control (and the author no more than other readers) their lives and their actions. What Bayard is calling for is nothing short of an abolition of the boundaries we habitually postulate between fiction and real life. "In literature as in life," he writes at one point in L'Affaire du chien des Baskerville (63), and that phrase, even if its rhetorical order were reversed, could be taken as a motto for his theoretical enterprise as a whole.
The question of whether we ought to imagine the migratory process in a figural or a literal way remains, however. In a more recent text, Bayard tempers the polemical quality of his integrationist stance a bit. In Aurais-je sauvé Geneviève Dixmer? he argues that the refusal of metaleptic possibility is founded in a double misunderstanding. The first consists in imagining metalepsis as a conscious gesture, rather than an unconscious one, because "the unconscious makes no distinction between a living being and a fictional character" (26). The second involves the way we migrate into a fictional world: "The notion of entering into a book implies not a material action, but rather a psychic operation, what philosophers call a thought experiment" (27). Bayard thus finesses the question with considerable agility, it should be noted, moving on both of the fronts he invokes toward the figural and away from the literal. In consequence, the position that he now occupies is distinctly more rationalist than some of those that he has staked out in the past.
My own brief for an inside-out mode of reading is simpler, and undoubtedly more naive. Though it may seem utopian to some, it is chiefly founded in pragmatics, for to my way of thinking it describes the way we actually behave when we read fiction more precisely than other models. It suffices to realize that we are far more supple, more tolerant, more agile, more playful when we approach a fictional world than we typically are when we grapple with the phenomenal world. It also helps to recognize that we can immerse ourselves up to our necks in fiction, while never abdicating our critical faculties, that the one gesture does not debilitate the other. To the contrary, immersion actuates our critical sense, and our critical sense stokes our desire to inhabit the fictional world. If such were not the case, Jean-Philippe Toussaint's protagonist would see nothing more than a rainy street when he gazes out the window. And gazing upon him, we would see no more than random scribblings on a page. Odysseus, Panurge, Eugénie Grandet, Gregor Samsa, Humbert Humbert, Oskar Matzerath, all of them from Ahab to Zeno, mere constructs! And their worlds pure figments: no more flying carpets, no more hansom cabs, no more magic lamps, no more tartar steppes! Such a perspective does not bear contemplation for long. Its very bleakness urges us toward another position, I think. One that we can occupy at our leisure, and wherein we are no longer obliged to choose between subject and object, self and other, inside and out.
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